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I. INTRODUCTION 
Racial bias in the United States’ criminal justice system is a serious 
problem,1 and Washington State is no exception.2 The groundbreaking 
Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System 
(Task Force Report) revealed striking evidence of racial and ethnic bias 
at various stages of criminal proceedings3 and highlighted the need for an 
integrated strategy to combat its prevalence. 
Among nine potential causes of racial disparity identified and ad-
dressed in the Task Force Report,4 one attracted a great deal of public 
attention in 2011: prosecutorial decision-making.5 While the Task Force 
Report focused on decision-making in the context of charging and sen-
tencing recommendations,6 decision-making also includes prosecutors’ 
presentations to the jury and their general courtroom conduct. Specifical-
ly, one prosecutor’s blatant use of racial stereotypes in the courtroom in 
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 1. Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washing-
ton’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) [hereinafter Task Force 
Report]. 
 2. Id. at 639−40. 
 3. Id. at 629. 
 4. Id. The Task Force Report identified and synthesized research on nine issues for which 
evidence exists regarding the causes of Washington’s disproportionality: (1) Juvenile Justice; (2) 
Prosecutorial Decision-Making; (3) Confinement Sentencing Outcomes; (4) Legal Financial Obliga-
tions (LFO); (5) Pretrial Release; (6) Drug Enforcement; (7) Asset Forfeiture; (8) Traffic Stops; and 
(9) Driving While License Suspended (DWLS). Id. at 638. 
 5. Id. at 647. 
 6. Id.; see also Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 814 n.75 (2012). 
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State v. Monday7—in which the Washington State Supreme Court held 
that the injection of racial bias required reversal—brought prosecutors’ 
conduct to the center of public debate.8 
In April 2006, a man was shot four times following a confrontation 
between multiple individuals in downtown Seattle,9 and he succumbed to 
his wounds upon arrival at a nearby hospital.10 Two others shot during 
the attack survived.11 A video camera close to the scene of the shooting 
captured an image of a man in a “distinctive, long red shirt” drawing a 
pistol and firing the gunshots that struck all three victims.12 Though 
many witnesses gave inconsistent accounts of the incident and were re-
luctant to cooperate with police, two witnesses identified defendant Kev-
in L. Monday, Jr. as the shooter.13 Police arrested Monday three weeks 
later while he was wearing a red shirt and hat that were “strikingly simi-
lar” to the clothing worn by the shooter in the video.14 During subsequent 
police questioning, Monday confirmed that he was the man wearing the 
red shirt in the video, and he confessed shortly thereafter that he was the 
shooter.15 Officers later recovered bullet cartridges from Monday’s home 
that were identical to those used in the shooting.16 
Prosecutors charged Monday with first-degree murder and two 
counts of first-degree assault, and the case proceeded to trial.17 During 
the testimony of one witness who previously identified Monday as the 
shooter, the prosecutor frequently pronounced the word “police” as “po-
leese.”18 The prosecutor also referenced a code of conduct that certain 
people do not talk to the police about criminal matters.19 He returned to 
                                                            
 7. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551 (Wash. 2011). 
 8. See, e.g., Jason A. Gilmer, Guest Opinion: Washington High Court Deals Blow to Racial 
Bias, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, June 19, 2011, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2011/jun/19/guest-
opinion-washingtons-high-court-deals-blow/; Jennifer Sullivan, Seattle Murder Conviction Tossed 
Out Over “Racist” Comments, SEATTLE TIMES, June 9, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/localnews/2015279772_overturned10m.html. 
 9. Monday, 257 P.3d at 552. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. The shooter fired a total of eleven gunshots before fleeing outside of the camera’s van-
tage point. Id. at 561 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 552 (majority opinion). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. When police told Monday that his DNA and fingerprints were found on shell casings 
from the shooting (which was not true), Monday replied, “I wasn’t trying to kill that man, I didn’t 
mean to take his life.” Id. at 553. 
 16. State v. Monday, No. 60265-9, 2008 WL 5330824, at *10 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2008); 
Monday, 257 P.3d at 553. Police also recovered an empty gun holster from Monday’s home. Id. 
 17. Monday, 257 P.3d at 553. 
 18. Id. at 553–55. 
 19. Id. The following is an excerpt from the prosecutor’s questioning of the witness, who was 
an African-American woman: 
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the theme during closing argument where he made the racial implications 
of his theme explicit: 
[T]he only thing that can explain to you the reasons why witness af-
ter witness after witness is called to this stand and flat out denies 
what cannot be denied on that video is the code. And the code is 
black folk don’t testify against black folk. You don’t snitch to the 
police.20 
The prosecutor revisited the theme several times and argued that “the 
code” was the reason witnesses gave testimony inconsistent with their 
own pretrial statements.21 The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three 
counts,22 and the appellate court affirmed the verdicts on appeal.23 On the 
question of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate court held that while 
the prosecutor improperly injected racial overtones into the proceedings, 
the error was harmless.24 
The Washington State Supreme Court disagreed and held that the 
prosecutor’s improper conduct constituted reversible error.25 The court 
found that “[t]he prosecutor’s misconduct tainted nearly every lay wit-
ness’s testimony. It planted the seed in the jury’s mind that most of the 
witnesses were, at best, shading the truth to benefit the defendant.”26 
Based on this improper conduct, the court determined that it could not 
“say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
                                                                                                                                     
Q. And would you agree or disagree with the notion that there is a code on the streets that 
you don’t talk to the po-leese? 
A. I mean, that’s what some people say. That’s what some people go by. 
Q. Well, can you help us understand who these some people are? 
A. I’m saying—I’m just saying that’s how some people is. Some people talk to the po-
lice, some don’t. 
Q. And you’re one of those that don’t, right? 
A. I’m saying—well, I don’t—police ain’t my friends or nothing. 
. . . . 
Q. Does that mean that you’re one of those people who don’t talk to the police? 
A. No, sometimes I don’t talk to the po-leese. I mean, they got a question or something to 
ask me, I answer. I don’t talk to them. 
Id. at 553. The prosecutor concluded this line of questioning when, in response to the witness noting 
that numerous witnesses to the shooting did not contact the police, he asked again whether there is “a 
code on the streets that you don’t call the poleese.” Id. at 554. 
 20. Id. at 555. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. State v. Monday, No. 60265-9, 2008 WL 5330824, at *12 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2008). 
 24. The court found that “[t]he prosecutor’s actions in Monday’s trial were clearly improper 
when he invoked race in his closing argument and affected an accent when questioning Sykes.” Id. at 
*10. But it held that the prosecutor’s improper conduct constituted harmless error because of the 
large amount of evidence admitted against Monday. Id. 
 25. Monday, 257 P.3d at 558. 
 26. Id. 
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verdicts,” and thus held that a new trial was required.27 In so holding, the 
court radically reshaped the long-used analysis for prosecutorial miscon-
duct and signaled a new intolerance toward racial bias in criminal pro-
ceedings. 
But the court did not unanimously fashion a single test for use in 
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct involving racial bias, which 
prompted an ensuing debate within Washington’s legal community.28 
The tests articulated in Monday’s majority, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions provide three different ways to address the complex problem of 
racial bias in Washington that continues to persist. All three tests 
acknowledge that racial bias during criminal trials is a serious problem 
that requires a strong judicial response. But the appropriate form of that 
response prompted separate opinions that highlight four distinct differ-
ences regarding how to best combat racial bias. 
First, the opinions differ regarding the source of law that should be 
applied when an existing legal framework proves inadequate to address a 
social problem. Following Monday, an open question remains regarding 
whether it is best to draw upon existing legal precedent, even if attenuat-
ed, or whether it is better to combat old problems with new law. Second, 
the three opinions differ in the degree of racial bias required to trigger a 
reversal of a conviction. Thus, the opinions raise a question as to whether 
a showing of flagrant or apparent racial bias should be necessary for a 
court to vacate a conviction, or whether racial bias in the courtroom is so 
offensive that any showing of racial discrimination should be sufficient 
to vacate a conviction. 
Third, the opinions differ in the amount of judicial discretion they 
afford courts to identify racial bias, which is of particular importance 
because many appeals to racial bias are subtle or unconscious.29 But 
questions persist regarding the criteria that should be used to decide 
whether racial bias is present in the courtroom. Finally, the three opin-
ions do not conclusively define how much weight courts should afford 
competing interests in determining an appropriate judicial response to 
racial bias. Whether victims’ rights and the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system as a whole should be considered remains unresolved. 
Despite their differences, both the majority and concurring opinions 
in Monday present new ways to address prosecutorial misconduct, deter 
the injection of racial bias into courtroom proceedings, and create sub-
stantively similar outcomes. Part II of this Note discusses the traditional 
prosecutorial misconduct test in Washington State, as well as the rules 
                                                            
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Gilmer, supra note 8; Sullivan, supra note 8. 
 29. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 629. 
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articulated by the Monday majority and concurrence. Part III discusses 
the implications of both the majority and concurring opinions, the prima-
ry differences in their approaches to deterrence, the degree of racial bias 
they require to warrant reversal of a conviction, and the discretion they 
afford the judiciary. Part III also suggests that courts must consider both 
the rights of criminal defendants and the aggregate impacts of racial bias 
on society at large when fashioning a rule to combat racial bias. 
II. WHEN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FALLS SHORT: 
TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
The majority and concurring opinions in Monday were both 
groundbreaking due to their departure from Washington legal precedent. 
For nearly forty years, Washington courts have employed a prosecutorial 
misconduct test that requires reversal if the prosecuting attorney’s con-
duct is both improper and prejudicial.30 Under this test, courts consider 
the effect of the prosecutor’s improper conduct in the context of the full 
trial, rather than in isolation.31 Generally, the appellant must demonstrate 
a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict in 
order to warrant reversal.32 If the defendant fails to object to a prosecu-
tor’s conduct during the trial, then the burden on the defendant is even 
higher. The prosecutor’s conduct must then be so flagrant and ill-
intentioned that it causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could 
not have been neutralized by a curative instruction to the jury.33 Despite 
the longstanding history of the law, both the majority and concurrence in 
Monday found the traditional test for prosecutorial misconduct insuffi-
cient to address instances where a prosecutor injects racial bias into a 
criminal trial. 
In contrast to the traditional prosecutorial misconduct analysis, 
courts apply a heightened harmless error standard in Washington when 
an error during trial implicates a constitutional right.34 If the appellant 
shows that a constitutional error occurred, “the State bears the burden of 
proving that the error was harmless” because the error is presumptively 
prejudicial.35 “A constitutional error is harmless if the appellate court is 
                                                            
 30. See, e.g., Monday, 257 P.3d at 555; State v. Fisher, 202 P.3d 937, 947 (Wash. 2009) (citing 
State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1253 (Wash. 2006)). 
 31. See, e.g., State v. McKenzie, 134 P.3d 221, 226 (Wash. 2006). 
 32. State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359, 392 (Wash. 2007) (citing State v. Brown, 940 P.2d 529, 564 
(Wash. 1997)). 
 33. Fisher, 202 P.3d at 951. 
 34. State v. Guloy, 705 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Wash. 1985). This heightened standard is referred to 
as the constitutional harmless error standard. See, e.g., State v. Moreno, 132 P.3d 1137, 1142 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
 35. Guloy, 705 P.2d at 1191. 
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convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would 
have reached the same result in the absence of the error.”36 Thus, the 
primary features of this constitutional harmless error standard are that it 
(1) shifts the burden of proof to the State and (2) requires a showing of 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Courts traditionally apply constitutional harmless error to certain 
types of prosecutorial misconduct. When a prosecutor has been shown to 
have improperly implicated a constitutional right of a defendant, courts 
apply a constitutional harmless error analysis that requires reversal un-
less the State demonstrates “beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence 
is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt.”37 Sub-
sequent appellate court decisions have frequently relied on this formula-
tion,38 which is the functional equivalent of the constitutional harmless 
error standard. Courts apply this standard when constitutional rights oth-
er than the right to a fair trial are impacted by the prosecutor’s actions.39 
For example, one court applied the constitutional harmless error standard 
when a prosecutor improperly referenced the defendant’s choice to exer-
cise his right to self-representation.40 
Courts also apply burden-shifting when analyzing accusations of 
prosecutorial misconduct that arise from racial bias during jury selec-
tion.41 If a defendant establishes a prima facie case for purposeful dis-
crimination regarding how a prosecutor exercised a peremptory chal-
lenge,42 then “the burden shifts to the one making the challenge to articu-
late a race-neutral explanation for each challenge.”43 The trial court then 
considers all relevant circumstances in order to determine whether a 
challenge was improperly motivated.44 It is during the trial court’s de-
                                                            
 36. Id. 
 37. State v. Traweek, 715 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Blair, 816 P.2d 718 (Wash. 1991). 
 38. See, e.g., Moreno, 132 P.3d at 1142; State v. Contreras, 788 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1990), rev. denied, 797 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1990). 
 39. Traweek, 715 P.2d at 1152–53. 
 40. Moreno, 132 P.3d at 1142. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated, “The defend-
ant is a picture perfect example of a domestic violence abuser. He has got to be in control. He is still 
trying to call the shots. So much so that he has exercised his constitutional rights to defend himself, 
because power is that important to him.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 41. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 42. “A defendant meets this burden if he or she establishes [that] peremptory challenges were 
exercised against a member of a protected class; and if so, when taken together with other relevant 
circumstances, an inference can be raised indicating the challenge was based on membership in the 
class.” State v. Beliz, 15 P.3d 683, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). This step simply requires a defendant 
to produce sufficient evidence “to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has 
occurred.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005). 
 43. Beliz, 15 P.3d at 687. 
 44. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170. Specifically, the trial court may base its determination on both 
the prosecution’s explanation and the juror’s demeanor and credibility. Beliz, 15 P.3d at 687. 
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termination that the persuasiveness of the prosecution’s justification be-
comes relevant.45 
But the traditional prosecutorial misconduct analysis, absent any 
burden shift, is the test historically applied when a prosecutor injects ra-
cial bias into trial proceedings. The Monday dissent is demonstrative of 
this approach, as it applied traditional law to arrive at a result contrary to 
the outcome reached by the other two opinions.46 In fact, the dissent ex-
pressly criticized the other opinions for their departure from Washington 
case law.47 According to the dissent, the circumstances in Monday were 
not indications of systematic failure, and were thus insufficient to war-
rant departure from forty years of precedent. 
The dissent applied the traditional prosecutorial misconduct test and 
found that the prosecutor’s conduct did not warrant reversal. First, the 
dissent found that the prosecutor’s use of the pronunciation “po-leese” 
was improper.48 But it did not find any impropriety in the prosecutor’s 
references to “the code,” as it characterized such arguments as broad 
statements describing “a too common occurrence: the unwillingness of 
individuals (no matter their age or race) to identify by name others who 
may be involved in crime.”49 The dissent then found that the defendant’s 
convictions did not warrant reversal after balancing the prosecutor’s im-
proper actions, the wealth of evidence admitted against the defendant, 
and the instructions given to the jury.50 Under the traditional analysis, the 
persuasive value of the video evidence admitted against the defendant 
weighed heavily in favor of harmless error.51 The dissent believed that 
“[e]ven if the prosecutor’s comments arguably tainted the jury’s impres-
sions of some witnesses, this could not affect the jury’s perception of the 
videotape and other evidence.”52 Thus, it found that the defendant did not 
demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the ju-
ry’s verdict.53 
                                                            
 45. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171. 
 46. See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 564–65 (Wash. 2011) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 565 (“[The court] never meddle[s] with such established constitutional protections, 
unless a compelling showing is made that the current test has failed and is causing harm.”). 
 48. Id. at 564 (characterizing the prosecutor’s use of the pronunciation “po-leese” as “inappro-
priate and unprofessional”). But the dissent felt that the court could not find, based solely on the trial 
transcript, that the pronunciation was de facto “racially derogatory language.” Id.  
 49. Id. at 563. But to find that statements regarding “the code” were not improper, the dissent 
minimized the overt racial link included in the references. See id. (treating the statement “black folk 
don’t testify against black folk” as a racially neutral condemnation of witnesses’ unwillingness to 
testify). 
 50. Id. at 564. 
 51. Id. at 562–63 (viewing the videotape evidence as sufficient to prove that the defendant 
committed deliberate, premeditated murder). 
 52. Id. at 565. 
 53. Id. 
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Neither the majority nor the concurring opinion in Monday disputed 
whether the prosecutor’s conduct constituted harmless error under the 
traditional analysis of prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, the dissent stat-
ed that “[t]he majority’s refusal to thoroughly engage in the second 
prong of [the traditional] analysis is tacit acknowledgment that the de-
fendant” would not have been found to be prejudiced under the tradition-
al standard.54 But both the majority and concurring opinions acknowl-
edged that the traditional analysis of prosecutorial misconduct was insuf-
ficient to address instances where the prosecutor intentionally injects ra-
cial bias into the proceedings. And in hopes of deterring future appeals to 
racial bias, both broke from tradition and applied novel legal analyses 
that would vacate convictions obtained under facts analogous to those in 
Monday. 
III. NEW APPROACHES TO AN OLD PROBLEM: COMBATING RACIAL BIAS 
IN STATE V. MONDAY 
Both the majority and the concurrence departed from traditional le-
gal precedent in State v. Monday, implicitly suggesting that the existing 
law on prosecutorial misconduct was insufficient to address prosecutors’ 
use of racial bias in the courtroom. Section A outlines the tests proffered 
by both the majority and the concurrence in Monday, while section B 
highlights the similarities and differences in the practical application of 
the two tests. 
A. Departure from Tradition: The Rules Articulated by the Monday 
Majority and Concurrence 
Both opinions acknowledge that racial bias is a problem, and alt-
hough their approaches to combating its prevalence appear to markedly 
differ, they are, in practice, substantively similar. 
1. The Majority Rule: Flagrant or Apparent Appeals to Racial Bias 
May Warrant a New Trial 
In Monday, the Washington State Supreme Court departed from 
convention55 and applied the constitutional harmless error standard to 
prosecutorial misconduct inquiries arising from racial bias.56 A five-
justice majority held “that when a prosecutor flagrantly or apparently 
intentionally appeals to racial bias in a way that undermines the defend-
                                                            
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 558 (majority opinion) (“If our past efforts to address prosecutorial misconduct have 
proved insufficient to deter [intentional appeals to racial bias], then we must apply other tested and 
proven tests.”). 
 56. Id. 
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ant’s credibility or the presumption of innocence, [the court] will vacate 
the conviction unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the mis-
conduct did not affect the jury’s verdict.”57 The majority also expressly 
stated that when the defendant demonstrates that such misconduct oc-
curred, the burden is on the State to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the misconduct was harmless.58 The court then applied this 
new standard to the facts of Monday and held that, due to the pervasive-
ness of the “taint” caused by the prosecutor’s misconduct, it “[could not] 
say beyond a reasonable doubt that the [misconduct] did not contribute to 
the verdicts.”59 
While the majority opinion departed from the existing law on pros-
ecutorial misconduct, its application of a constitutional harmless error 
standard has some basis in Washington law. As previously described,60 
courts apply the constitutional harmless error standard when a prosecutor 
improperly implicates a defendant’s constitutional right.61 Although not 
historically applied to conduct that impacts a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial,62 the majority’s application of constitutional harmless error to pros-
ecutorial misconduct involving racial bias can be viewed as a modest 
extension of prior law to a narrow subset of instances in which the right 
to a fair trial is affected. Additionally, courts use burden-shifting to ana-
lyze claims of racial bias in the selection of a jury.63 While the standard 
applied differs from constitutional harmless error, the use of burden-
shifting indicates that courts recognize that once racial bias is demon-
strated, the party who engaged in the improper conduct should bear the 
burden of justification. Nonetheless, the majority’s rule still represents a 
novel application of these principles. 
2. The Concurrence: Zero Tolerance for Racial Bias 
The Monday concurrence fashioned a new rule never before applied 
in Washington State. It proposed that any degree of racial discrimination 
is sufficient to vacate a conviction, regardless of whether the bias had an 
impact on the outcome of the trial.64 The concurring opinion stated that 
“[a] criminal conviction must not be allowed to stand when it is obtained 
                                                            
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See supra Part II. 
 61. See, e.g., State v. Moreno, 132 P.3d 1137, 1142 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Contreras, 
788 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
 62. See State v. Traweek, 715 P.2d 1148, 1152–53 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Blair, 816 P.2d 718 (Wash. 1991). 
 63. See, e.g., State v. Beliz, 15 P.3d 683, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 64. Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
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in a trial permeated by racial bias deliberately introduced by the prosecu-
tion.”65 Thus, “regardless of the evidence of . . . guilt, the injection of 
insidious discrimination into [a] case is so repugnant to the core princi-
ples of integrity and justice upon which a fundamentally fair criminal 
justice system must rest that only a new trial will remove its taint.”66 The 
concurrence’s proposed rule takes a hard stance on any racial discrimina-
tion employed by prosecutors in the courtroom, and is the most extreme 
of the three Monday opinions. 
The concurrence based its proffered rule on the “core principles of 
integrity and justice upon which a fundamentally fair criminal justice 
system must rest.”67 As indicated by the concurrence’s reliance on case 
law from outside jurisdictions, those core principles of integrity and jus-
tice are grounded in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.68 
While no other Washington case has expressly held that a prosecutor’s 
injection of racial bias impeded the right to a fair trial, the Washington 
State Supreme Court previously made clear that the presence of racial 
bias in jury members amounts to a violation of due process.69 But outside 
Washington, ample authority exists for the premise that a prosecutor’s 
injection of racial considerations into a case undermines a defendant’s 
fundamental right to a fair trial.70 Thus, while the concurrence in Monday 
proposed the creation of a new rule and the expansion of due process in 
Washington, that proposal rested on the foundations of due process al-
ready recognized in other jurisdictions. 
B. Tackling Subtle Discrimination: The Deterrence of Racial Bias and 
the Role of Judicial Discretion 
Deterring prosecutors’ use of racial bias in the courtroom was of 
central importance in both the majority and concurring opinions. But the 
two opinions differ in their view of how courts should deter racist con-
duct. The majority deters prosecutors’ injection of racial bias into trial 
proceedings by imposing a high burden on the State to show that the ap-
peal to race did not impact the outcome of the case. In contrast, the con-
                                                            
 65. Id. at 558. 
 66. Id. at 558–59. 
 67. Id. at 558. 
 68. Id. at 559 (“[S]uch cases involve the ‘point where the due process and equal protection 
clauses overlap or at least meet.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 
152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973))). 
 69. State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 994 (Wash. 2000) (“Under the laws of Washington, the right to 
a jury trial includes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury. ‘The failure to accord an accused 
a fair hearing violates the minimal standards of due process.’” (citing State v. Parnell, 463 P.2d 134, 
137 (Wash. 1969))).  
 70. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964). 
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curring opinion imposes a per se ban on any resort to racial discrimina-
tion. Additionally, the opinions differ on the degree of racial bias neces-
sary to warrant reversal, as well as the discretion that should be afforded 
courts to determine whether reversal is warranted. 
1. Practical Effect of the Rules Articulated by the Monday 
Majority and Concurrence 
The majority imposed its new standard as a deterrent measure 
against the use of racist arguments and other appeals to racial bias, which 
it viewed as “fundamentally opposed to our founding principles, values, 
and fabric of our justice system.”71 As the opinion explained, “When the 
government resorts to appeals to racial bias to achieve its ends, all of so-
ciety suffers . . . .”72 The majority noted that a prosecutor’s intentional 
appeals to racial bias violate a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial 
trial:73 
Because appeals by a prosecutor to racial bias necessarily seek to 
single out one racial minority for different treatment, it fundamen-
tally undermines the principle of equal justice and is so repugnant to 
the concept of an impartial trial its very existence demands that ap-
pellate courts set appropriate standards to deter such conduct.74 
As the majority eloquently stated, “If justice is not equal for all, it is not 
justice.”75 Having recognized that the “highly improper” conduct of the 
prosecutor in Monday would essentially be rewarded under a traditional 
harmless error analysis, the majority deemed that analysis to be “insuffi-
cient to deter such conduct” and thus expanded the use of the constitu-
tional harmless error standard.76 The majority thus achieved its goal of 
deterring racial bias by placing a high burden on the State to show that an 
appeal to race did not impact the outcome of the case. 
But the majority’s approach has been criticized for minimizing the 
evidence admitted against the defendant in order to find that the State did 
not meet its burden under the constitutional harmless error standard.77 
                                                            
 71. Monday, 257 P.3d at 557. 
 72. Id. at 558 n.5. 
 73. Id. at 557–58. The court clarified that “[t]he constitutional promise of an ‘impartial jury 
trial’ commands jury indifference to race.” Id. at 557. “‘[T]heories and arguments based upon racial, 
ethnic and most other stereotypes are antithetical to and impermissible in a fair and impartial trial.’” 
Id. at 557 (quoting State v. Dhaliwal, 79 P.3d 432, 444 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers, J., concurring)). 
 74. Id. at 558. 
 75. Id. at 557. 
 76. Id. at 557–58. 
 77. See Michael Callahan, Note, “If Justice Is Not Equal For All, It Is Not Justice”: Racial 
Bias, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Right to a Fair Trial in State v. Monday, 35 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 827, 836 (2012) (arguing that the majority minimized the strength of the State’s case in order 
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For instance, the concurring opinion expressly recognized that the de-
fendant confessed to the murder,78 and both the concurrence and dissent 
discussed the persuasiveness of the video evidence, with the dissent ad-
dressing the matter at length.79 The majority opinion did not mention the 
defendant’s confession outside of its recitation of the facts,80 and it rele-
gated all discussion of the video evidence to a footnote in which it admit-
ted that “the videotape clearly establishes that Monday was the shoot-
er.”81 While the majority argued that the video did not establish premedi-
tation or rule out some defenses,82 it also did not recognize the additional 
evidence admitted against the defendant, such as the casings found at his 
home, the out-of-court identifications of him as the shooter, and above 
all, the confession he made to police.83 
Regardless of whether the majority downplayed the evidence in or-
der to reach a specific result, the precedential value of its treatment of the 
evidence, when combined with the constitutional harmless error stand-
ard, creates an extremely difficult burden for the State to satisfy. In order 
for the State to carry its burden, it must demonstrate “beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, that the misconduct did not affect the [jury’s] verdict.”84 In 
Monday, the evidence admitted against the defendant was very strong: 
(1) the defendant was caught on video scuffling with and shooting the 
victims; (2) two witnesses provided out-of-court statements identifying 
the defendant as the shooter; (3) the defendant was arrested wearing a 
shirt and hat that were “strikingly similar” to those he wore the night of 
the shooting; (4) bullet cartridges matching those used in the shooting 
were found in the defendant’s home; and (5) the defendant confessed to 
both the shooting and the murder.85 Under the harmless error analysis, 
the evidence must be weighed against the prosecutorial misconduct, 
which included numerous references to a purported African-American 
antisnitching code and four uses of the pronunciation “po-leese.”86 
Despite the substantial evidence entered against the defendant, the 
majority still did not find that the State met its burden to demonstrate 
                                                                                                                                     
to hold that the error warranted a new trial); see also Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., con-
curring) (characterizing the majority’s harmless error analysis as “illusory”). 
 78. Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 n.1 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). The same footnote also references 
the dissent’s recognition of the confession, id., though it appears that any once-made references by 
the dissent to that particular statement were removed prior to publication of the opinion. 
 79. See id.; id. at 560–63 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 553 (majority opinion). 
 81. Id. at 558 n.4. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 553. 
 84. Id. at 558. 
 85. Id. at 553. 
 86. Id. at 553–55. 
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harmless error. Again, the defendant was clearly caught on video shoot-
ing the victims, and he later confessed, in no uncertain terms, that he was 
the shooter. Both of these pieces of evidence were admitted at trial, and 
the state supreme court still did not find harmless error. The practical 
effect of the majority’s holding is that when future courts look to apply 
constitutional harmless error to facts that are analogous to those in Mon-
day, they will note that even near-overwhelming evidence against the 
defendant is insufficient to overcome an intentional injection of racial 
bias into the proceedings. 
The concurring opinion took a different approach to deterring racial 
bias in the courtroom by proposing a per se ban on any resort to racial 
discrimination. The opinion stated that “[r]egardless of the evidence 
against this defendant, a criminal conviction must not be permitted to 
stand on such a foundation. The appeals to racism here by an officer of 
the court are so repugnant to the fairness, integrity, and justness of the 
criminal justice system that reversal is required.”87 Thus, the concurrence 
suggested that Monday’s conviction should be reversed because “the in-
tegrity of our justice system demands it.”88 
Legal scholars have questioned whether the Monday majority opin-
ion created such a high burden for the State that it effectively serves as 
an illusory harmless error standard.89 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a 
circumstance in which the state could meet its burden, considering the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt accumulated against the defendant in 
Monday. “Rather than engage in an unconvincing attempt to show the 
error here was not harmless,”90 the concurrence would have held that any 
resort to racial bias is enough to warrant reversal, even if it had no im-
pact on the outcome of the case. The proffered rule would have a strong 
deterring effect, and prosecutors would likely think twice before resort-
ing to any conduct that could be perceived as racially biased. 
Ultimately, regardless of whether courts apply the constitutional 
harmless error standard’s heavy burden of proof or the concurrence’s per 
se reversal of convictions tainted with racial discrimination, a strong de-
terrence against prosecutorial appeals to racial bias will be realized. 
2. The Degree of Racial Bias Necessary to Warrant Reversal 
While both the majority and concurring opinions agree that racial 
bias in the courtroom is a serious concern and should not be tolerated, the 
                                                            
 87. Id. at 560 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Callahan, supra note 77, at 839; see also Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concur-
ring) (characterizing the majority’s harmless error analysis as “illusory”). 
 90. Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
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question that remains following Monday is whether a verdict tainted by 
racial bias should ever be permitted to stand. In some instances—albeit 
rare—the majority opinion would allow for a verdict to stand even if the 
prosecutor exhibited racial bias during the course of the trial. So long as 
the State produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the appeal did not affect either the credibility of the de-
fendant or the presumption of innocence, the court could deem the racial 
bias harmless. But under the concurrence’s proffered rule, a verdict could 
never stand if racial discrimination was deliberately introduced during 
the trial proceedings, even if the evidence accumulated against the de-
fendant was substantial and the appeal to race had no impact.91 While the 
level of tolerance for racial bias raises questions regarding from whose 
perspective one should measure resulting harm, an application of either 
test will likely produce substantially similar outcomes. 
Some scholars express concern that, similar to the traditional harm-
less error standard employed in the dissent, the majority’s rule still al-
lows for instances of racial bias.92 Under the majority rule, if racial bias 
is introduced into the trial proceedings but the State satisfies its burden 
under constitutional harmless error, then no new trial is warranted. This 
allowance of racial bias is in stark contrast with the concurrence’s pro-
posed rule, which would essentially create a per se ban against the injec-
tion of racial bias.93 
But this criticism ignores the fact that the majority in Monday 
granted a new trial even when faced with very substantial evidence sup-
porting the defendant’s guilt. As the concurrence stated in Monday, “a 
prosecutor’s intentional appeals to racial prejudices cannot be minimized 
or easily rationalized as harmless,”94 and the manner in which the majori-
ty applied its rule demonstrates just how difficult it will be for the State 
to show harmlessness under that rule. Courts currently have only the 
facts of Monday to analogize or distinguish when ruling on prosecutorial 
misconduct that involves racial bias. And an appellate court seeking to 
uphold such misconduct as harmless will have to provide a strong justifi-
cation for its decision, lest it later be reversed by the state supreme court. 
The concurrence’s proffered rule minimizes the impact that racial 
bias must have on the outcome of the case to warrant reversal. According 
to the concurrence, racial discrimination need not have a definitive im-
pact on any one aspect of the case to reverse a conviction, for the “injec-
tion of such discrimination is ‘antithetical to the purposes of the four-
                                                            
 91. Id.  
 92. See Callahan, supra note 77, at 841−42. 
 93. Id. at 843. 
 94. Monday, 257 P.3d at 558 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
2012] Like Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing 863 
teenth amendment . . . whether in a procedure underlying, the atmos-
phere surrounding, or the actual conduct, of a trial.’”95 Thus, the concur-
ring opinion seems to suggest that any improper appeal to race, not just 
blatant racial discrimination, is enough to affect a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.96 
Under the concurrence’s proposed rule, “the right to a fair trial that 
is free of improper racial implications is so basic to the federal Constitu-
tion that an infringement upon that right can never be treated as harm-
less error.”97 Because the concurrence’s proposed rule would treat any 
improper resort to race as harmful to the core principles of the criminal 
justice system, it evaluates the resulting error not solely from the per-
spective of the criminal defendant, but also from the perspective of socie-
ty at large. The rule recognizes that while racial prejudice may not influ-
ence the outcome of a case if there is sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant, the use of racial bias has an impact beyond the courtroom—it 
undermines faith in the judiciary, facilitates the continued use of racial 
stereotypes, and perpetuates racial disparities in the criminal justice sys-
tem.98 
3. Judicial Discretion in Reversing a Conviction: Do Victims’ 
Rights and Efficiency Matter? 
The primary difference between the analyses of prosecutorial mis-
conduct articulated by the majority and concurring opinions is the 
amount of discretion afforded appellate courts in determining whether a 
verdict should be reversed. Considering the high burden established in 
Monday, the application of either test will likely result in the same out-
come. Thus, the future state of the law will largely depend on how favor-
ably courts regard the continued existence of some, albeit limited, discre-
tion to find harmless error when a prosecutor injects racial bias into trial 
proceedings. 
The discretion allowed by the Monday majority opinion provides 
courts with the ability to address the dissent’s concerns of justice and 
efficiency.99 Under the majority, courts may find harmless error in in-
stances where the prosecutor’s injection of racial bias did not affect the 
                                                            
 95. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 96. Id. (citing Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 610 (Del. 1988)). 
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 663. 
 99. The dissent felt that the rule articulated by the majority “delays or denies justice for the 
victim, disregarding the constitutional rights of Francisco Green and his family as victims under 
article I, section 35 of the Washington State Constitution. It is possible to deter any problematic trial 
conduct without denying justice for Francisco Green and his family.” Monday, 257 P.3d at 561 
(Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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proceedings. The court may thereby ensure speedy justice for the victims 
and efficient use of the court’s limited resources when the ordering of a 
new trial would be needless. Given the weight of the evidence against the 
defendant, if the prosecutor in Monday never made any reference to “the 
code” but used the pronunciation “po-leese” four times, would a new 
trial have been warranted? What if he had said “po-leese” only once? At 
some point, the need for deterrence may be outweighed by other con-
cerns of the court, and the majority’s opinion provides courts with the 
tools to address that possibility. 
The concurrence allows appellate courts no discretion in deciding 
whether racial bias warrants a reversal. If racial discrimination is present, 
reversal is required per se. The opinion makes no mention of efficien-
cy,100 seemingly prioritizing the right to a fair trial over any concerns of 
judicial economy. There is a preexisting basis in Washington law for 
minimizing efficiency in favor of protecting defendants’ rights to be free 
from racial bias. The Washington State Supreme Court previously stated 
that “more important than speedy justice is the recognition that every 
defendant is entitled to a fair trial before 12 unprejudiced and unbiased 
jurors. Not only should there be a fair trial, but there should be no linger-
ing doubt about it.”101 
But defendants in criminal proceedings are entitled to only a fair 
trial, not an error-free trial.102 Thus, one’s view of the rules articulated by 
the majority and concurrence will depend largely on whether one be-
lieves it possible, under any circumstances, for a trial to be fair if racial 
bias is injected into the proceedings. 
4. Defining Racial Bias in Contemporary Proceedings 
One of the challenges of combating racial bias is that racial stereo-
types are often rooted in learned human behavior and reflected in deci-
sion-making that is difficult to isolate.103 While racial bias can be diffi-
cult to identify, the aggregate impact of those decisions is easier to locate 
and measure.104 And it is largely the aggregate impact, rather than indi-
                                                            
 100. While the concurring opinion does not expressly address concerns of judicial economy, 
the impact of the rule’s application may indirectly address them. If all convictions resulting from a 
trial tainted by racial discrimination were reversed, the resulting deterrent effect would eradicate 
prosecutors’ incentive to resort to racial bias—and do so quickly. With fewer prosecutors resorting 
to conduct that could be deemed racially biased, fewer convictions, if any, may require reversal. 
 101. State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 994 (Wash. 2000) (citing State v. Parnell, 463 P.2d 134, 137 
(Wash. 1969)). 
 102. State v. Fisher, 202 P.3d 937, 947 (Wash. 2009). 
 103. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 629; see also Smith & Levinson, supra note 6, 823 
n.116. 
 104. Id. at 663. 
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vidual behaviors, that produces a lasting impact on society. Thus, in or-
der to reduce racial bias among prosecutors, courts must address not only 
blatant and conscious bias, but also subtle and unconscious bias.105 Both 
the majority and concurring opinion do just that—the majority through 
its acknowledgement of “apparent racial bias” and the concurrence 
through its zero-tolerance approach to racial discrimination. 
Acknowledging the need to address subtle and unconscious bias is a 
much-needed step in combating racial disparities within Washington’s 
criminal justice system. The Task Force Report findings indicate that 
racial disproportionalities in Washington’s criminal justice system are 
not primarily caused by intentional racism, but rather by practices and 
policies that facilitate racialized outcomes.106 Because most racial bias is 
unconscious, the Task Force Report recommended concentration not on 
individual motives but instead on those practices and procedures that 
cumulatively produce racial disproportionalities.107 
The Monday majority opinion acknowledged that bias may be diffi-
cult to identify, as “[n]ot all appeals to racial prejudice are blatant. Per-
haps more effective but just as insidious are subtle references. Like 
wolves in sheep’s clothing, a careful word here and there can trigger ra-
cial bias.”108 But just how to identify the subtle racial bias or how to 
tackle its use remains open to debate. Specifically, whether the impact of 
subtle bias should be measured from the standpoint of only the criminal 
defendant or from the standpoint of society at large remains an open 
question. 
The concurrence’s rule takes a strong stance on subtle racial bias 
because it considers not just the impact of racial discrimination on a par-
ticular case but also the aggregate impact of that discrimination.109 As 
described in the Task Force Report, while subtle biases have some influ-
ence in any given case, they have their most substantial effects over 
time.110 Thus, by measuring the impact of racial bias by its aggregate 
impact on society at large, rather than as it pertains to a single criminal 
defendant, the concurrence seeks to eradicate racial bias within the sys-
tem as a whole. 
                                                            
 105. Id. at 644. 
 106. “[R]ace-effects are likely to be unconscious and unintended rather than conscious and 
purposeful. While traditional models of racism emphasize individual acts of discrimination or racial-
ly charged policies, structural racism describes the interaction between various institutions and prac-
tices that are neutral on their face but nevertheless produce racialized outcomes.” Id. at 645. 
 107. Id. 
 108. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011). 
 109. See id. at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
 110. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 663. 
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But what standard are courts to apply when determining whether 
racial bias exists in a particular case, however subtle or unconscious it 
may be? The majority’s opinion provides meaningful guidance to future 
courts as to what type of conduct constitutes an injection of racial bias. 
Monday held that constitutional harmless error is applied “when a prose-
cutor flagrantly or apparently intentionally appeals to racial bias in a way 
that undermines the defendant’s credibility or the presumption of inno-
cence.”111 The inclusion of qualifying terms such as flagrant,112 appar-
ent,113 and intentional114 provides courts with guidelines for the applica-
tion of the new standard and demonstrates that the improper act must be 
clear to the court.115 
The facts of Monday also help to demonstrate the situations to 
which this standard applies. The prosecution’s repeated invocation of an 
African-American antisnitch code “functioned as an attempt to discount 
several witnesses’ testimony on the basis of race alone.”116 The court 
recognized that more subtle references can be just as insidious.117 The 
prosecutor’s use of the pronunciation “po-leese” was regarded by the 
court as a likely deliberate attempt to call attention to the ethnicity of the 
witness and to emphasize the aforementioned code.118 Again, “[l]ike 
wolves in sheep’s clothing, a careful word here and there can trigger ra-
cial bias.”119 Both types of improper prosecutorial conduct had the effect 
of undermining the presumption of the defendant’s innocence by 
“plant[ing] the seed in the jury’s mind that most of the witnesses were, at 
best, shading the truth to benefit the defendant.”120 
In contrast to the majority’s formulation of the types of racial bias 
to which its rule is applied, the concurrence provides courts with great 
discretion in determining whether racial discrimination is present in a 
particular case. Despite affording zero discretion for a court to let a ver-
dict tainted by racial bias stand, the opinion provided no criteria upon 
which to gauge whether a prosecutor engaged in racial discrimination. 
One possible result is that courts would apply a “you know it when you 
see it” analysis, considering the facts and circumstances of each case. 
                                                            
 111. Monday, 257 P.3d at 558. 
 112. When used to describe an offense or an offender, “flagrant” means “glaring, notorious, 
scandalous, [or] blatant.” SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 2007). 
 113. Something is “apparent” when it is visible, manifest, or obvious. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 112 (9th ed. 2009). 
 114. An act is “intentional” when “[d]one with the aim of carrying out the act.” Id. at 883. 
 115. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 116. Monday, 257 P.3d at 557. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 558. 
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But if the concurrence’s rule is applied at some future date, then courts 
may simply utilize the formulation given by the majority as guidance for 
its application. 
Regardless of whether courts apply the rule from the majority or the 
concurrence, the true fight over prosecutorial misconduct will lie in 
whether the defendant has demonstrated that improper conduct occurred 
that would warrant application of the second step of the rule. Whether 
the second step is shifting the burden to the State or vacating the verdict, 
both the majority and the concurrence require courts to first determine 
whether a particular type of improper conduct occurred. Under the con-
currence’s standard, a demonstration that improper conduct occurred re-
quires the court, without any further analysis, to vacate the verdict and 
remand the case for a new trial.121 Under the majority’s rule, a showing 
of improper conduct then shifts the burden to the State to demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was harmless.122 This stand-
ard, as applied to the facts present in Monday, is likely to be very diffi-
cult for the State to satisfy.123 Thus, the State will likely focus its efforts 
on contending that no misconduct occurred that would trigger the second 
step of whichever rule applies.124 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Task Force Report concludes with the following reminder: 
Our democracy is based on the rule of law and faith in the fairness 
of the justice system. This faith is undermined by disparity and by 
high-profile incidents of violence toward people of color by law en-
forcement. The problem is not a “people of color” problem. It is our 
problem as a society to address.125 
As acknowledged in the Task Force Report, the legitimacy of 
Washington’s criminal justice system is limited by the extent to which 
the people appreciate its value. Thus, if the people of Washington lose 
faith in the criminal justice system because convictions tainted by racial 
bias are permitted to stand, not just criminal defendants but all of society 
will suffer. While the future of the law combating prosecutorial racial 
                                                            
 121. Id. at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
 122. Id. at 558 (majority opinion). 
 123. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 124. Indeed, appellate courts are already beginning to focus their attention on whether improp-
er conduct occurred such that application of the Monday rule is warranted. See State v. Pierce, No. 
39348-4-II, 2011 WL 5357095, at *15–16 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding reference to “no-
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Fuller, No. 67435-8-1, 2011 WL 4489006, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011) (finding alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct did not inject racial bias into the trial proceedings). 
 125. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 671. 
868 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:849 
bias in Washington remains uncertain and the best approach to combat 
its presence has sparked widespread debate, what is certain is that the 
solution must be one that is fair and maintains the respect of those who 
put their trust in the system. 
